6 ارديبهشت 1395

The Long Divorce:saudi arabia and U.S.A(مقالات راهبردی - انگلیسی )


he initial defining moment of President Barack Obamas attitude toward Saudi Arabia, for many people, was when he bowed to King Abdullah as he shook his hand at the London G-20 summit meeting in April 2009. The gesture, which the White House vehemently denied was a bow at all, was variously interpreted as the new president groveling toward an important ally, or an early sign of Obamas capacity to charm.

The Saudis themselves probably werent fooled. They would have known of Obamas 2002 speech in Chicago, just over a year after the terror attacks of 9/11. That speech is most famous for Obamas opposition to President George W. Bushs planned invasion of Iraq, which he referred to as a "dumb war." But the then-state senator also had a pointed message about the two countries that formed the pillars of U.S. influence in the Middle East.

"You want a fight, President Bush?" Obama asked. "Lets fight to make sure our so-called allies in the Middle East -- the Saudis and the Egyptians -- stop oppressing their own people, and suppressing dissent, and tolerating corruption and inequality."

So much has changed in the world since that awkward bow in 2009, never mind since 2002, and the nature of the U.S.-Saudi relationship has changed along with it. As the eight years of George W. Bush came to an end, the oil price was less than $50 per barrel, and would climb to well over $100 in 2014. Few people had heard of shale oil -- mention of the possibility of U.S. energy independence, which the oil could soon make possible, would have been met with derisive laughter. In the Middle East, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was very much in power, as was Syrias Bashar al-Assad. It would be two more years before uprisings would seize those countries, and Washingtons response in both cases would dismay Saudi officials.

Obama will meet King Salman in Riyadh on April 20, during what will likely be his final trip to Saudi Arabia during his presidency. Such meetings between national leaders are usually used for discussions about common interests rather than detailed agendas. The common question is: Are the allies on the same metaphorical page? But with the United States and Saudi Arabia today, it will be more interesting to see whether they can plausibly suggest they are still reading from the same book.

Although the upcoming visit is being touted as an effort in alliance-building, it will just as likely highlight how far Washington and Riyadh have drifted apart in the past eight years. For Obama, the key issue in the Middle East is the fight against the Islamic State: He wants to be able to continue to operate with the cover of a broad Islamic coalition, of which Saudi Arabia is a prominent member. For the House of Saud, the issue is Iran. For them, last years nuclear deal does not block Irans nascent nuclear status -- instead, it confirms it. Worse than that, Washington sees Iran as a potential ally in the fight against the Islamic State. In the words of one longtime Washington-based observer: "Saudi Arabia wanted a boyfriend called the United States. The United States instead chose Iran. Saudi Arabia is beyond jealousy."

Despite the possible pitfalls, both sides will have assembled lists of "asks" for the visit. These will probably be expressed in side meetings, given the kings increasing delegation of his powers to Crown Prince Muhammad bin Nayef, known as MbN, and particularly his son, Deputy Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman, aka MbS. Besides the Islamic State and Iran, the topics are likely to include Yemen, where the kingdom is increasingly bogged down, though there is hope for peace talks. The crucial interlocutor will be MbS, the 30-year-old who is increasingly expected to become king sooner rather than later -- though the notional succession currently in place would first hand the crown to his cousin, MbN. MbS is known for touting his vision of a modernized Saudi Arabia with an economy that has moved beyond oil.

Obamas attitude toward Saudi Arabia does not seem to have changed since his 2002 speech, and his comments about the kingdoms rulers will be an elephant in the room during these talks. The presidents criticism of Americas "so-called allies" is a recurring theme in Jeffrey Goldbergs cover story for the Atlantic, "The Obama Doctrine." The 19,000-word article begins with Obamas retreat from his "red line" after Bashar al-Assads forces used sarin gas against civilians in 2013 -- an event that shocked U.S. allies in the Middle East and forced them to reconsider what U.S. security guarantees actually meant, but which the president described as a decision that made him "very proud."

Why Obama decided to give the interview now -- rather than, say, in April 2017 -- is a mystery to many, who see it as damaging his diplomatic credibility. The profile will cast a dark cloud over Obamas meetings in Riyadh and make the platitudes of his public statements less convincing. Counterterrorism cooperation, for instance, will be a key element in the talks -- but in the Atlantic, Obama questioned "the role that Americas Sunni Arab allies play in fomenting anti-American terrorism," Goldberg wrote, and "is clearly irritated that foreign-policy orthodoxy compels him to treat Saudi Arabia as an ally."

When Malcolm Turnbull, the new Australian prime minister, last year asked Obama, "Arent the Saudis your friends?" Goldberg writes: "Obama smiled. Its complicated, he said."

Obamas skepticism appears to have permeated his entire administration. Its gotten to the point where Saudi officials fear that the administration prefers their rivals in Tehran to their longstanding ally. "In the White House these days, one occasionally hears Obamas National Security Council officials pointedly reminding visitors that the large majority of 9/11 hijackers were not Iranian, but Saudi," Goldberg wrote. When the author observed to Obama that he wasnt as likely as his predecessors to instinctively back Saudi Arabia in a dispute with Iran, Goldberg continued, Obama "didnt disagree."

Obama simply doesnt seem to share the view of many Middle East leaders that the Islamic Republic of Iran wants to diminish U.S. influence and change the balance of power in the region. Saudi leaders increasingly fear the president has no interest in constraining Irans regional ambitions. The single line that probably generated the most apoplexy in Riyadh when the Atlantic profile was published was when the president implored Iran and its rivals "to find an effective way to share the neighborhood and institute some sort of cold peace."

Saudi Arabia has no interest in sharing the Arab world with its archrival. It sees Iran as challenging its leadership of the Islamic world and undermining its standing in the Arab world. Given Irans nuclear agreement and its revival in oil production, Riyadhs status as a leader of the energy world is also threatened -- even if it will be years, if ever, that Iran can rival its standing as the worlds largest oil exporter.

These fundamentally different perspectives on the Middle East may be the cause of the tensions between Riyadh and Washington, but Obama and King Salman will face other problems when they come face-to-face this week. Meetings with the 80-year-old Saudi monarch are carefully choreographed to obscure, at least to the public gaze, Salmans increasing infirmity. Obama has already encountered this. When he came to Riyadh early last year to offer condolences on the death of King Abdullah, he had a conversation with Salman during which the king simply walked away without warning. Aides attempted to excuse him, saying he needed to break for prayers. Last September, when King Salman visited the Oval Office, he brought his favorite son, Muhammad bin Salman, to do the talking.

For most meetings, King Salman has a computer screen, often obscured by flowers, in front of him, serving as a teleprompter. With a recent U.S. delegation, the royal court devised another stratagem -- the king spent the meeting looking beyond the group at a widescreen television suspended from the ceiling. An aide off to one side furiously hammered talking points into a keyboard.

The two heads of state will not be able to avoid discussing their rival interpretations of the events of 9/11, when 15 out of the 19 hijackers were Saudi. The issue has been revived by the calls in Congress for the publication of the missing 28 pages from the 9/11 Report, which have remained classified, supposedly to spare the Saudi government embarrassment because of possible connections between the hijackers and Saudi officials. Riyadhs continuing sensitivity on this point was underscored over the weekend, when the kingdom warned that it would sell off U.S. assets worth hundreds of billions of dollars if Congress passes a bill allowing the Saudi government to be held responsible in American courts for any role in the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.

How this issue will play out is hard to predict. But as I first wrote in an August 2002 Wall Street Journal op-ed, there is much more to the links between the hijackers and the House of Saud than many are willing to admit. That article cited a Jan. 9 story in U.S. News & World Report, titled "Princely Payments," in which senior intelligence officials and a former Clinton administration official said that two senior Saudi princes had been paying off al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden since a 1995 bombing in Riyadh, which killed five U.S. military advisors.

Saudi officials vehemently denied the claim, with current Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir quoted as saying: "Wheres the evidence? Nobody offers proof. Theres no paper trail."

As I wrote in the Wall Street Journal in 2002: "I followed the lead and quickly found U.S. and British officials to tell me the names of the two senior princes. They were using Saudi official money -- not their own -- to pay off bin Laden to cause trouble elsewhere but not in the kingdom. The amounts involved were hundreds of millions of dollars, and it continued after Sept. 11. I asked a British official recently whether the payments had stopped. He said he hoped they had, but was not sure."

If the Saudi leadership hopes to repair its relationship with the United States, it must find a way to put questions like this to bed. But the starkness of the presidents criticisms in the Atlantic probably make rapprochement to the former levels of diplomatic and economic intimacy between the United States and Saudi Arabia impossible, in any case.

The president certainly doesnt intend to travel to Riyadh to sign the death certificate of the relationship. Nevertheless, the Obama administration may have ushered in a new era in ties between Washington and Riyadh -- one more distant and marred by suspicion than in years past. One way or another, it will be a historic trip.


Simon Henderson 

Also available in العربية

Foreign Policy

April 20, 2016

 

 

14:30

(0)


The Long Divorce:saudi arabia and U.S.A(مقالات راهبردی - انگلیسی )


he initial defining moment of President Barack Obamas attitude toward Saudi Arabia, for many people, was when he bowed to King Abdullah as he shook his hand at the London G-20 summit meeting in April 2009. The gesture, which the White House vehemently denied was a bow at all, was variously interpreted as the new president groveling toward an important ally, or an early sign of Obamas capacity to charm.

The Saudis themselves probably werent fooled. They would have known of Obamas 2002 speech in Chicago, just over a year after the terror attacks of 9/11. That speech is most famous for Obamas opposition to President George W. Bushs planned invasion of Iraq, which he referred to as a "dumb war." But the then-state senator also had a pointed message about the two countries that formed the pillars of U.S. influence in the Middle East.

"You want a fight, President Bush?" Obama asked. "Lets fight to make sure our so-called allies in the Middle East -- the Saudis and the Egyptians -- stop oppressing their own people, and suppressing dissent, and tolerating corruption and inequality."

So much has changed in the world since that awkward bow in 2009, never mind since 2002, and the nature of the U.S.-Saudi relationship has changed along with it. As the eight years of George W. Bush came to an end, the oil price was less than $50 per barrel, and would climb to well over $100 in 2014. Few people had heard of shale oil -- mention of the possibility of U.S. energy independence, which the oil could soon make possible, would have been met with derisive laughter. In the Middle East, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was very much in power, as was Syrias Bashar al-Assad. It would be two more years before uprisings would seize those countries, and Washingtons response in both cases would dismay Saudi officials.

Obama will meet King Salman in Riyadh on April 20, during what will likely be his final trip to Saudi Arabia during his presidency. Such meetings between national leaders are usually used for discussions about common interests rather than detailed agendas. The common question is: Are the allies on the same metaphorical page? But with the United States and Saudi Arabia today, it will be more interesting to see whether they can plausibly suggest they are still reading from the same book.

Although the upcoming visit is being touted as an effort in alliance-building, it will just as likely highlight how far Washington and Riyadh have drifted apart in the past eight years. For Obama, the key issue in the Middle East is the fight against the Islamic State: He wants to be able to continue to operate with the cover of a broad Islamic coalition, of which Saudi Arabia is a prominent member. For the House of Saud, the issue is Iran. For them, last years nuclear deal does not block Irans nascent nuclear status -- instead, it confirms it. Worse than that, Washington sees Iran as a potential ally in the fight against the Islamic State. In the words of one longtime Washington-based observer: "Saudi Arabia wanted a boyfriend called the United States. The United States instead chose Iran. Saudi Arabia is beyond jealousy."

Despite the possible pitfalls, both sides will have assembled lists of "asks" for the visit. These will probably be expressed in side meetings, given the kings increasing delegation of his powers to Crown Prince Muhammad bin Nayef, known as MbN, and particularly his son, Deputy Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman, aka MbS. Besides the Islamic State and Iran, the topics are likely to include Yemen, where the kingdom is increasingly bogged down, though there is hope for peace talks. The crucial interlocutor will be MbS, the 30-year-old who is increasingly expected to become king sooner rather than later -- though the notional succession currently in place would first hand the crown to his cousin, MbN. MbS is known for touting his vision of a modernized Saudi Arabia with an economy that has moved beyond oil.

Obamas attitude toward Saudi Arabia does not seem to have changed since his 2002 speech, and his comments about the kingdoms rulers will be an elephant in the room during these talks. The presidents criticism of Americas "so-called allies" is a recurring theme in Jeffrey Goldbergs cover story for the Atlantic, "The Obama Doctrine." The 19,000-word article begins with Obamas retreat from his "red line" after Bashar al-Assads forces used sarin gas against civilians in 2013 -- an event that shocked U.S. allies in the Middle East and forced them to reconsider what U.S. security guarantees actually meant, but which the president described as a decision that made him "very proud."

Why Obama decided to give the interview now -- rather than, say, in April 2017 -- is a mystery to many, who see it as damaging his diplomatic credibility. The profile will cast a dark cloud over Obamas meetings in Riyadh and make the platitudes of his public statements less convincing. Counterterrorism cooperation, for instance, will be a key element in the talks -- but in the Atlantic, Obama questioned "the role that Americas Sunni Arab allies play in fomenting anti-American terrorism," Goldberg wrote, and "is clearly irritated that foreign-policy orthodoxy compels him to treat Saudi Arabia as an ally."

When Malcolm Turnbull, the new Australian prime minister, last year asked Obama, "Arent the Saudis your friends?" Goldberg writes: "Obama smiled. Its complicated, he said."

Obamas skepticism appears to have permeated his entire administration. Its gotten to the point where Saudi officials fear that the administration prefers their rivals in Tehran to their longstanding ally. "In the White House these days, one occasionally hears Obamas National Security Council officials pointedly reminding visitors that the large majority of 9/11 hijackers were not Iranian, but Saudi," Goldberg wrote. When the author observed to Obama that he wasnt as likely as his predecessors to instinctively back Saudi Arabia in a dispute with Iran, Goldberg continued, Obama "didnt disagree."

Obama simply doesnt seem to share the view of many Middle East leaders that the Islamic Republic of Iran wants to diminish U.S. influence and change the balance of power in the region. Saudi leaders increasingly fear the president has no interest in constraining Irans regional ambitions. The single line that probably generated the most apoplexy in Riyadh when the Atlantic profile was published was when the president implored Iran and its rivals "to find an effective way to share the neighborhood and institute some sort of cold peace."

Saudi Arabia has no interest in sharing the Arab world with its archrival. It sees Iran as challenging its leadership of the Islamic world and undermining its standing in the Arab world. Given Irans nuclear agreement and its revival in oil production, Riyadhs status as a leader of the energy world is also threatened -- even if it will be years, if ever, that Iran can rival its standing as the worlds largest oil exporter.

These fundamentally different perspectives on the Middle East may be the cause of the tensions between Riyadh and Washington, but Obama and King Salman will face other problems when they come face-to-face this week. Meetings with the 80-year-old Saudi monarch are carefully choreographed to obscure, at least to the public gaze, Salmans increasing infirmity. Obama has already encountered this. When he came to Riyadh early last year to offer condolences on the death of King Abdullah, he had a conversation with Salman during which the king simply walked away without warning. Aides attempted to excuse him, saying he needed to break for prayers. Last September, when King Salman visited the Oval Office, he brought his favorite son, Muhammad bin Salman, to do the talking.

For most meetings, King Salman has a computer screen, often obscured by flowers, in front of him, serving as a teleprompter. With a recent U.S. delegation, the royal court devised another stratagem -- the king spent the meeting looking beyond the group at a widescreen television suspended from the ceiling. An aide off to one side furiously hammered talking points into a keyboard.

The two heads of state will not be able to avoid discussing their rival interpretations of the events of 9/11, when 15 out of the 19 hijackers were Saudi. The issue has been revived by the calls in Congress for the publication of the missing 28 pages from the 9/11 Report, which have remained classified, supposedly to spare the Saudi government embarrassment because of possible connections between the hijackers and Saudi officials. Riyadhs continuing sensitivity on this point was underscored over the weekend, when the kingdom warned that it would sell off U.S. assets worth hundreds of billions of dollars if Congress passes a bill allowing the Saudi government to be held responsible in American courts for any role in the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.

How this issue will play out is hard to predict. But as I first wrote in an August 2002 Wall Street Journal op-ed, there is much more to the links between the hijackers and the House of Saud than many are willing to admit. That article cited a Jan. 9 story in U.S. News & World Report, titled "Princely Payments," in which senior intelligence officials and a former Clinton administration official said that two senior Saudi princes had been paying off al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden since a 1995 bombing in Riyadh, which killed five U.S. military advisors.

Saudi officials vehemently denied the claim, with current Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir quoted as saying: "Wheres the evidence? Nobody offers proof. Theres no paper trail."

As I wrote in the Wall Street Journal in 2002: "I followed the lead and quickly found U.S. and British officials to tell me the names of the two senior princes. They were using Saudi official money -- not their own -- to pay off bin Laden to cause trouble elsewhere but not in the kingdom. The amounts involved were hundreds of millions of dollars, and it continued after Sept. 11. I asked a British official recently whether the payments had stopped. He said he hoped they had, but was not sure."

If the Saudi leadership hopes to repair its relationship with the United States, it must find a way to put questions like this to bed. But the starkness of the presidents criticisms in the Atlantic probably make rapprochement to the former levels of diplomatic and economic intimacy between the United States and Saudi Arabia impossible, in any case.

The president certainly doesnt intend to travel to Riyadh to sign the death certificate of the relationship. Nevertheless, the Obama administration may have ushered in a new era in ties between Washington and Riyadh -- one more distant and marred by suspicion than in years past. One way or another, it will be a historic trip.


Simon Henderson 

Also available in العربية

Foreign Policy

April 20, 2016

 

 

14:30

(0)


20 آذر 1394

Flexing New Powers, Congress to Review Arms Shipments to Saudi Arabia(مقالات راهبردی - انگلیسی )

concerned about the rising death toll in Yemen, a Senate panel wants more oversight of $1.29 billion in U.S. weapons shipments to Riyadh.

BY JOHN HUDSON
DECEMBER 10, 2015
Flexing New Powers, Congress to Review Arms Shipments to Saudi Arabia


For the first time, and against a rising death toll in Yemen, the U.S. Senate is using new oversight powers to track American weapons sales to Saudi Arabia, Foreign Policy has learned.

The move signals a growing unease on Capitol Hill with the Saudi-led war effort against Houthi rebels in Yemen, a conflict the United Nations says has killed more than 5,700 people and has forced another 2.3 million from their homes.

The oversight effort, initiated by the two senior members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, follows an intense lobbying push by U.S.-based humanitarian aid groups opposed to the pending sale of nearly $1.3 billion in bombs and other warheads to Riyadh. The State Department approved the tentative sale last month and it is expected to clear congressional hurdles this week.

The organizations leading the charge against the weapons sale include Oxfam America, Amnesty International USA, and Human Rights Watch. The groups accuse Washington of being complicit in what they call Saudi Arabias "indiscriminate" airstrikes in Yemen where about 2,500 civilians have died in the fighting.

"Arms transfers give a green light to indefinite military intervention, substantially relieving the pressure on the coalition and the government of Yemen to agree to a ceasefire," Oxfam America senior humanitarian policy adviser Scott Paul told Foreign Policy.

The Senate panels new power flex will not stop the weapons shipments. But they force more oversight of arms sales even as lawmakers continue debate on whether - and how aggressively - to rein in Riyadh.

Democratic Sens. Ben Cardin of Maryland and Ed Markey of Massachusetts have repeatedly raised concerns about "gross violations of human rights"throughout Riyadhs military campaign in Yemen, which began last March.

Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) continues to support the Saudi-led operation against the Houthis, which he believes will help "end the conflict, facilitate humanitarian relief, and restore the legitimate government of Yemen," an aide told FP.

Even so, both Corker and Cardin requested that the committee be notified of future weapons shipments, according to their aides. That means the State Department is on order to notify Congress at least 30 days before each new weapons shipment to Saudi Arabia.

"By invoking this new authority, the Senate committee is now saying that we want to monitor each shipment of the ordnance - and its a lot of ordnance," said another congressional aide. "This will be the first time its used."

The Saudi-led air campaign - which is bolstered by the United States, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates, and other countries - began after Shiite Houthi rebels from northern Yemen seized the capital of Sanaa last year and ousted President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, a Sunni.

Riyadh and its Gulf allies view the Houthi insurgents as an instrument of Iran, despite the rebels longtime presence in Yemen. Saudi Arabia, an overwhelmingly Sunni kingdom, initially promised a quick military operation aimed at reinstalling Yemens "legitimate" government. But the war has dragged on, stoking a humanitarian disaster and destroying Yemens infrastructure.

Next week, the conflicts rival parties will meet in Switzerland for U.N.-mediated peace talks. On Monday, Hadi announced the possibility of a seven-day ceasefire if the Houthis agree to it; similar Saudi proposals this year have failed to stem the violence.

The U.S. governments proposed weapons deal with Saudi Arabia includes some of the most advanced precision weapons systems in the world. It includes an estimated 18,000 bombs and 1,500 other pieces of artillery, like the Joint Direct Attack Munitions, or JDAMs, which are capable of bringing down huge, fortified buildings in a single strike. These so-called "smart munitions" are equipped with GPS guidance systems, which could reduce the risk of indiscriminate attacks.

A State Department official defended the arms sales Thursday, calling it part of U.S. efforts to maintain security and diplomatic ties "that are essential to promoting peace and stability in the Gulf region."

Yet the State official also acknowledged the looming humanitarian catastrophe, urging all parties to attend the Switzerland talks next week and agree to a ceasefire that he said would "bring immediate relief to the people of Yemen" - including food, water, medicine, and fuel. The official spoke on condition of anonymity.

But previous diplomatic efforts have fallen short, and aid groups said theres little reason for forces on either side to stand down so long as Saudi Arabia continues to receive weapons from allies like the United States.

"Providing the Saudis with more bombs under these circumstances is a recipe for greater civilian deaths, for which the U.S. will be partially responsible," said Joe Stork, a deputy director at Human Rights Watch.

By ordering a stricter review of arms sales, the Senate committee hopes to gain a better sense of how effective the Saudi-led air campaign has been. So far, congressional officials have been disappointed in how little information the Obama administration has provided on Riyadhs "burn rate" - how quickly it goes through its weapons stockpile.

One congressional aide said the new oversight would help, even if it "is not going to give us a good fix on the human rights issues."

"Theres a lot of ordnance going over there for the prosecution of the Yemen air campaign, and the Foreign Relations Committee wants to know whats getting shipped and when," the congressional aide added. "Its a necessary part of coming to a better assessment as this air campaign continues."


 

18:58

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20 دی 1390

he New York Times is Misleading the Public on Iran(مقالات راهبردی - انگلیسی )

The paper has made faulty allegations about Irans nuclear programme without running proper corrections. January 09, 2011 "- - Washington, DC, United States - Its deja vu all over again. AIPAC is trying to trick the United States into another catastrophic war with a Middle Eastern country on behalf of the Likud Partys colonial ambitions, and the New York Times is misleading the public with allegations that say that the country is developing "weapons of mass destruction". In an article attributed to Steven Erlanger on January 4 ("Europe Takes Bold Step Toward a Ban on Iranian Oil"), this paragraph appeared: The threats from Iran, aimed both at the West and at Israel, combined with a recent assessment by the International Atomic Energy Agency that Irans nuclear programme has a military objective, is becoming an important issue in the American presidential campaign [emphasis my own]. The claim that there is "a recent assessment by the International Atomic Energy Agency that Irans nuclear programme has a military objective" is misguided. As Washington Posts Ombudsman Patrick Pexton noted on December 9: But the IAEA report does not say Iran has a bomb, nor does it say it is building one, only that its multiyear effort pursuing nuclear technology is sophisticated and broad enough that it could be consistent with building a bomb. Indeed, if you try now to find the offending paragraph on the New York Times website, you cant. They took it down. But there is no note, like there is supposed to be, acknowledging that they changed the article, and that there was something wrong with it before. Sneaky, huh? You can still find the original here. Indeed (at least at the time of writing), if you go to the New York Times website and search with the phrase "military objective", the article pops right up. But if you open the article, the text is gone. But again, there is no explanatory note saying that they changed the text. This is not an isolated example in the Times reporting. On the very same day, January 4, they published another article, attributed to Clifford Krauss ("Oil Price Would Skyrocket if Iran Closed the Strait of Hormuz"), that contained the following paragraph: Various Iranian officials in recent weeks have said they would blockade the strait, which is only 21 miles wide at its narrowest point, if the United States and Europe imposed a tight oil embargo on their country in an effort to thwart its development of nuclear weapons [emphasis again my own]. At time of writing, that text is still on the New York Times website. Of course, referring to Irans "development of nuclear weapons" without qualification implies that it is a known fact that Iran is developing nuclear weapons. But it is not a known fact: It is an allegation. Indeed, when US officials are speaking publicly for the record, they say the opposite. As Washington Posts Ombudsman Patrick Pexton also noted on December 9: This is what the US director of national intelligence, James R Clapper, told the Senate Armed Services Committee in March: "We continue to assess [that] Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons in part by developing various nuclear capabilities that better position it to produce such weapons, should it choose to do so. We do not know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons. To demand a correction, you can write to the New York Times here. To write a letter to the editor, you can write here. To complain to the New York Times Public Editor, you write here. Robert Naiman Policy Director at Just Foreign Policy

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